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My tongue did things by itself”:
story-telling/story-writing in
“Conversation with a Cupboard
Man” (Ian McEwan)
Richard Pedot
1 Ian McEwan’s short stories are notable for their use of solipsistic, and usually morally
disreputable, first person narrators, and also for the discrepancy between the squalor or
obscenity of the themes and a seemingly detached, unemotional narration. It is in fact
doubly surprising that the characters should be telling their stories: on ethical grounds, it
may be found scandalous, for instance, that a sexual pervert, guilty of the murder of a
young  girl,  should  be  able  to  recount  the  events  leading  to  that  crime  without  the
slightest trace of remorse or even of understanding; on intellectual grounds, it is no less
amazing to discover that the same person can simply express himself articulately.
2 Indeed,  in a 1978 interview, Ian Hamilton pointed out to the author that in his first
collection of short stories, First Love, Last Rites, “the first person narrator is a lot more
literate, if not literary, than you’d imagine him to be if you had a third person account of
how he actually behaves” (Hamilton 8).  This  might simply look like a then unsolved
technical problem for a young author trained in Norwich courses of creative writing and
at the time privileging pastiche to find his own style. McEwan at first took Hamilton’s
remark as “a legitimate criticism”, defining the issue as that of wanting it both ways: your
narrators, he claimed, may be fools, “and yet at the same time you want them to be fairly
perceptive people” “to carry lines which are your best lines”—which are therefore given
to “morally discredited” persons.
3 McEwan’s perhaps disingenuous eagerness to fall in with Hamilton’s observation—he was
after all, while still making his debut, talking to a leading critic—may in fact cloud the
issue. Pastiche and inexperience will explain the situation only up to a point and this at
the cost of ignoring that the idiosyncratic sense of unease elicited by the early stories
originates in the tension between an impossibility to communicate and the writerliness of
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the narrator’s account even in the simplest narrative form. It is precisely this tension that
a reading of the narratives in formal terms tends to underestimate even as it underlines it
—somehow dissolving the squalor  of  the subject  matter  into  aesthetics,  whether  the
result be considered as success or failure.
4 Unstated and unquestioned in the exchange between critic and writer is the assumption
that sordidness calls for a realistic or, better still, naturalistic rendering. This I take to be
the drift of both Hamilton’s question and McEwan’s proviso that “those stories are not
dramatic monologues inside a naturalistic framework.” The broader implications of the
issue for McEwan’s fiction are not my concern here1 but as a means of broaching the topic
of  orality  in  his  short  stories,  I  would  like  to  draw  attention  to  the  suggestion,  in
McEwan’s argument, that realistic/naturalistic fiction requires careful mimesis of oral
enunciation, but at the same time serves as a reminder that orality in written texts is first
and  foremost  a  textual  effect—and  as  such  liable  to  deconstruction.  My  working
hypothesis is that McEwan’s deconstruction of the oral/textual antinomy—and by the
same token of realism in fiction—has to be approached in relation to the stories’ specific
challenge: that of handing narration over to people usually deprived of speech—because
of  intellectual  incapacity  and/or  because  their  right  to  speak  is  queried  on  moral
grounds. We will see that pastiche—the borrowing of someone’s voice in order to pitch
one’s  own—can  take  on  parodic  implications,  as  a  critique  of  our  hermeneutic
assumptions, grounded in the belief in the prevalence of live speech (Derrida’s “parole vive
”) over writing.
5 The focus of study will be one particular story in McEwan’s first collection, “Conversation
with a Cupboard Man” (First Love, Last Rites), admittedly a pastiche of Fowles’s The Collector
. McEwan’s attempt with this story was “to do the kind of voice of the man” in Fowles’s
book, “that kind of wheedling, self-pitying lower middle-class voice” (Hamilton 18). In
fact, it is not primarily the quality of the character’s voice that is at stake in the stylistic
emulation,  but  rather,  technically  speaking,  narrative  voice,  as  the  enunciative
framework in which the reader is given a homodiegetic account of the main character’s
own  perversion.  The  term  nevertheless  in  itself  remains  ambiguous—still  too  much
fraught with psychological connotations, as Genette freely acknowledges (Genette 76)—,
even more so in regards with “Conversation”.
6 As a matter of fact, the story is especially interesting in a discussion of orality because it
at once foregrounds and forestalls (oral) communication. As a self-confessed dialogue it
seems to start auspiciously enough with the following incipit: “You ask me what I did
when I saw this girl. Well, I’ll tell you.” (75) Soon, however, the reader will realise that
there is no option other than to “listen” vicariously to the long soliloquy of a 18-year-old
“baby”, who had been kept in infancy—i.e. deprived of a language—by his mother, up to
the age of seventeen. The initial “you” will turn out to be a mute “social worker” (75)
whose actual function will never be elucidated, except as the recipient of the narrator’s
sorry  tale.  The  narrator  himself  is  a  young  man  whose  sole  aspiration,  in  his  own
admission, is “to climb into the pram” (87)—out of nostalgia for “the old cotton-wool life
when everything was done for me, warm and safe” (82)—and who has elicited for his
more or less permanent abode a large cupboard, in secluded darkness. His protracted
dependence on his mother in fact has rendered him incapable of any genuine contact
with the others, and his natural mode of conversation seems to be of the kind he had with
a deaf and dumb inmate of the prison where he served a term for various acts of juvenile
delinquency,  sitting  in  the  latter’s  cell  saying  nothing  or  at  times  pouring  out  his
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thoughts in perfect awareness that he couldn’t be understood. Basically, indeed, speech is
too much for him, as he tells his interlocutor: “I’m sitting in this chair with my arms
folded, that’s all right, but I’d rather be lying on the floor gurgling to myself than be
talking to you.” (76)
7 So it can be said that “Conversation” ironically stretches to the limits of verisimilitude
the discrepancy between inarticulacy and literacy, what can actually be spoken and what
is said. Yet, as a monologue addressed to an unknown and silent listener, the story has
nevertheless a feel of orality about it and contains many of the usual signs that betray or
rather mimic oral delivery in texts—to begin with its brevity, which is compatible with
short oral delivery. Sentences tend to be short, clipped, in a predominantly paratactic
sequence, as befits such kind of supposedly unrehearsed addresses in which the speaker
is not meant to have an overall view of his argument beforehand. This is perhaps the
most obvious feature borrowed from Fowles’s narrative. In both cases, the short syntactic
range is there to convey a sense of the narrowness of the narrator’s understanding which
is rooted in immediacy. This is not the linguistic disarticulation that one would expect
from such quarters, but neither is it perfect articulacy.
8 Orality is more obvious, to the point of overkill, in all the elements that support the idea
of an audience, from phatic phrases to shifters to rhetorical questions. The narrator’s
account  is  interspersed  with  words  that  do  not  have—at  first—precise  meaning  in
themselves with a view to maintaining the fragile bond of narrative between the young
man and his mute listener, or on the metatextual level, to underscoring it for the reader—
possibly the only audience.  The innocuous expletive “well”  is  to be expected,  and is
certainly used in its many guises, to emphasize a readiness to talk or go on with the
talking—as in “Well, I’ll tell you.”—or to offer a more or less genuine apology for one’s
behaviour—“I can see you think I’m dirty and bent. Well, I washed my hands afterwards,
which is more than some people.” (75). 
9 More common however are direct appeals to the addressee: variations of the “you know”
type (“you can imagine”,  “you’ve  no idea”,  …);  allusions  to  the  listener’s  judgement
(“don’t think”, “don’t get me wrong”, “I can see you think”, “you might be thinking”,
“you might say”, …) or, in a more circuitous way, to anyone’s judgement, presumably
including the listener’s  (“it  sounds  pretty  stupid” or  “incredible”,  “That  must  sound
pretty  stupid  to  you.”,  …)  Rhetorical  questions,  although they  are  by  definition  not
destined to be answered by the listener, if ever there is one, belong in a similar category,
in the sense that their purpose is more or as much to make a show of holding the line
than to help the argument forward (“Why didn’t I run off …?”, “What did I think of?”,
“How did I become an adult?”, “So what could I do?”, …) They are in fact neither more nor
less direct than the above forms of addressing the hypothetical social worker.
10 The  enunciative  stakes  could  then  be  reversed,  arguing  that  it  is  not  so  much  the
presence of  an audience that  requires such patterns of  communication,  as  the latter
which generate the audience, or simply make one possible. A witness is by no means
indispensable, except in potentia. As for the questions, they might as well be the implied
witness’s—be they explicitly voiced or the narrator’s guesswork—as the figment of the
latter’s imagination, in the absence of any actual addressee. The incipit—“You asked me
what  I  did when I  saw this  girl.”—is  a  good case  in  point,  as  it  dispenses  with any
interrogation mark, thereby vacillating between the re-statement of a former question, a
mere echo of it, and something akin to a demand that the question should be put to the
speaker, which is the same as putting it in the interlocutor’s mouth.
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11 Similar conclusions, of course, can be drawn as regards the direct appeals mentioned
above, which set up the conditions for the presence of an interlocutor rather than being
its by-product2. This seems to suggest that there is no inherent difficulty in mimicking
dialogue  in  texts,  since  dialogue  is  always  already  a  good  imitation  of  itself.  Such
indicators of orality as those alluded to up to now may be seen to work like grammatical
shifters, pointing to positions waiting to be filled up by applicants. As a matter of fact, all
of  them rely  on  the  I/you  deictic  pair,  itself  related  more  implicitly  to  spatial  and
temporal deixis.  Predictably, when this deixis is explicit, it contributes to reinforce the
illusion of  (the narrator’s,  and by the same token the social  worker’s)  presence,  but
significantly, this occurs exclusively in the opening and concluding paragraphs, as if to
frame the whole narrative, and more precisely to introduce the main prop: the cupboard. 
12 Interestingly enough, it is just as the narrator conjures up the big wardrobe—“You see
that cupboard there,  it  takes up most of  the room.” (75)—that the reader as implied
interlocutor is bound to feel the most frustrated: he cannot see—i.e. check the existence of
—what  the  use  of   shifters  (that, there ,  the)  implies  is  present  at  the  moment  of
enunciation, which is in turn validated in fiction by the existence, or imaginary presence,
of the narrator. This eventually suggests that the most successful imitation of orality in
narrative is  bound to be at  the same time the most doubtful.  The paradox has been
touched upon already,  it  is  that of  the inversion of  the process of  authentication:  in
writing, without the immediate presence of the speaker, it is the shifters that imply an
actual context instead and not the context that grants actuality to the shifters—“here”,
“now”, “you”, etc., being understood in relation to the moment and place of enunciation.
13 To return more specifically to “Conversation”, deictic reference moves in a circle. The
reader is led to infer the presence of the room and the piece of furniture because it is a
logical  consequence of  the oral  frame of  enunciation— of  the presence of  a narrator
pointing to them in his speech. At the same time, however, we take his narrative to be
oral because of the shifters, whose handling is specific to a context of oral, immediate
communication. Orality is deixis, deixis is orality.
14 Leaving aside the more general questions about phonocentrism such paradox elicits, we
are  still  confronted  to  a  narrative  which  problematises  enunciation  as  presence—or
presence as the site of enunciation—in the subtle play of deictic antinomies (here/there,
now/then). “Here”, the site of enunciation, designates the attic room where the narrator
is speaking, in opposition to “there”: “You see that cupboard there, it takes up most of
the room. I ran all  the way back here, climbed inside and tossed myself off.” (75) So
“there” is  not situated outside—though such a place exists—but within,  to the point,
however, of almost including it within itself, taking up most of it. This doesn’t spell the
end of the dichotomy in a fusion of opposites, but hints at a hierarchical reversal, with
the supplement exiled into secondary position claiming precedence.
15 As suggested by the numerous repetitions of “in there” at the end of the story, following
the reiteration of  the phrase concerning the volume taken up by the wardrobe,  the
latter’s inside is a crucial location for the narrator. The implication is that, even though
he is presently indulging in speech for the social worker’s sake, he’d rather be indulging
himself  in the dark and silent surrogate womb “there”.  He would therefore be truly
present to himself not when speaking, here, now, craving instead a pre-linguistic mode of
existence, which he has known for the greatest part of his life. The cupboard is not only
“there” but also “then”—“the old cotton-wool life” that seems to take up most of his
present life: “Mostly I sit in the cupboard thinking about the old times in Staines, wishing
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it all again.” (87) Yet, we should not jump to the conclusion that presence or reality exists
only  outside language,  in  perfect  unison with the maternal  body.  Instead we should
acknowledge a disturbing relation between silence and speech, bearing in mind that the
young man’s narrative, though legitimated by the social worker’s presence, working as a
prompt, revolves around a linguistic void, which can be considered as its originary site,
seeing its importance in the narrator’s mind. It is as if the there and then of silence, or of
gurgling, were presiding over the here and now, the whole scene, of story-telling—or is it
of writing?
16 The tension between here and there, now and then, also being that between speech and
silence,  finds  another  expression in  the  tension we started from:  between McEwan’s
characters’  literacy/literariness and their foolishness or,  we might even say at times,
their near-imbecility. The narrator of “Conversation” is no exception to the rule, as his
narrative seems such an impossible feat of utterance coming from someone deprived of
speech for so long. Indeed, the idiot telling the tale is no Benjy, he has learned a thing or
two,  and thus  at  times  resorts  to  unexpected notions,  that  do no sound his—as,  for
instance, when he rejects the hypothesis of “the pain-pleasure of being frustrated” (86) to
explain his nostalgia of the warm oven in which he had been locked up by a malevolent
cook, during a short-lived stint in a hotel kitchen.
17 Should we take the situation merely as evidence of inexperience or of the prevalence of
pastiche over naturalistic representation, we would miss much of the text’s capacity to
disturb. Read in terms of the narrator’s belated acquisition of language—experienced as
violent imposition—and his concomitant longing for a return to a pre-linguistic life “in
the pram”, the discrepancy between linguistic ability and existential idiocy takes on a
different colouring which is not necessarily detrimental to the diegetic stakes.
18 A brief consideration of the narrator’s summary of his apprenticeship will substantiate
this claim. This is how it begins:
How did I become an adult? I’ll tell you, I never did learn. I have to pretend. All the
things you take for granted I have to do it all consciously. I’m always thinking about
it, like I was on the stage. I’m sitting in this chair with my arms folded, that’s all
right, but I’d rather be lying on the floor gurgling to myself than be talking to you.
(76)
19 In the narrator’s perception, then, the language he uses, which he was forced to learn in
about two months (77) is not really his, but an imitation, role-playing. So much for the
immediate presence of the speaking subject to himself/herself in speech. “I have only one
language,  Derrida writes,  and it  is  not  mine” (Derrida 15).  Such is  the paradox that
McEwan dramatises by imagining the trauma of acquiring language in a seventeen-year-
old boy, of having, in the boy’s “own” words, his tongue doing “things by itself as if it
belonged to someone else” (77). The experience of language then is one of alienation,
even or perhaps especially that of psychology—the story’s Œdipal frame of reference is a
constant ironisation of psychoanalytic discourse. Eventually, no conversation is possible
because the implied social worker is offered a mirror of his/her discourse—which makes
his/her physical presence dispensable.
20 In  its  staging  of  language  as  dispossession,  “Conversation”  is  exemplary  of  the
deconstruction of the illusion of speech as presence to oneself. This, I would argued, is
achieved not despite the apparent impossibility—from a naturalistic point of view—of the
narrative voice, but because of it.  Much of McEwan’s short fiction—and this I take to
include  his  first  novel,  The  Cement  Garden—belongs  to  what  French  critic  Dominique
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Rabaté  calls  impossible narratives  (“textes  impossibles”—Rabaté  72),  among  which  he
ranks such first person narratives (or récits,  in Blanchot’s meaning) as Louis-René Des
Forêts’s  Le  Bavard,  Albert  Camus’s  L’Etranger,  Edgar  Poe’s  “William Wilson”,  or  again
Samuel Beckett’s The Unnameable. These fictions have the rhetorical power to mime oral
communication and involve the reader in the semblance of a direct address (“l’oralité
d’une parole, impliquant le lecteur dans ce qui semble une adresse directe”—Rabaté 17)
while being at the same time soliloquies. Hence a foregrounding of the narrative voice
(“monstration de leur voix narrative”—Rabaté 7) that puts into question its “presence”
(to itself).
21 This is where the scene of story-telling can be seen to become a scene of writing, which is
what the Genettian narratological concept of voice, according to Rabaté, tends to play
down.  The  paradoxical  combination  of  speech  and  silence  we  have  detected  in
“Conversation” thus emerges as the dramatisation of what, in Western culture at least,
defines writing—silent language or written voice. For the paradox is not the sole work of
fiction. It results from an inherent flaw within presence, a différance, in spoken language.
Fiction foregrounds the phonocentric illusion, the illusion of the fullness of live speech,
as a transparent and, as it were, oxymoronically, immediate medium of subjectivity. It
plays about with the play within (spoken) language. 
22 “Conversation” further problematises the default in presence by making apparent the
gap between the speaking subject and a language, his language, that belongs to someone
else and by a dramatic use of deictic reference sets the stage for the enigmatic bond of
silence and speech that seems to make narratives possible, or even perhaps, necessary.
The literariness of speech in McEwan’s story should not be taken as mere artistic blemish.
If it is that, how are we to account for the uneasiness felt at reading the solipsistic tale of
a “morally discredited” person? Rather it contributes to the problematisation of  oral
communication, emphasising in particular the alienation of perversion in the discourse
on perversion, toying with the (im)possibility of a discourse of perversion. How perversion
in McEwan’s fiction, far from being anecdotic, partakes of the exploration of the issue of
identity  in/through  language,  in  particular  by  the  challenge  it  constitutes  for  the
construction of narrative voice3, remains to be shown, but “Conversation” is undoubtedly
a good starting point for such an adventure.
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NOTES
1. See R. Pedot, Perversions textuelles dans la fiction d’Ian McEwan,  for an extended discussion of
such tensions within McEwan’s works up to Black Dogs.
2.  A stage performance of the story (Lyric Studio Theatre, Hammersmith, 1982) indeed dispensed
completely with the postulated social worker, effectively replaced by the audience.
3. Not surprisingly, Derrida’s Monolinguisme de l’autre, also queries the issue of identity, claiming
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ABSTRACTS
Le but de cet article est d’examiner la forme et la fonction du cadre énonciatif d’une nouvelle de
Ian McEwan, « Conversation with a Cupboard Man » (First Love, Last Rites), qui semble imiter (pour
mieux la  parodier)  une communication orale.  Il  apparaîtra  qu’en fait  cette  nouvelle  se  joue,
jusqu’aux  limites  de  la  vraisemblance,  du  hiatus  qui existe  entre  le  dit  et  ce  qui  peut
effectivement être énoncé, ou entre la littérarité des énoncés et l’incompétence linguistique des
narrateurs.  L’absence  de  traitement  réaliste  du  « dialogue »  entre  un  travailleur  social  et  le
narrateur de « Conversation with a Cupboard Man », un « bébé » de 18 ans, maintenu en enfance
(c’est-à-dire  privé  de  langage  articulé,  maintenu  infans)  par  sa  mère,  est  un  commentaire
ironique sur l’activité de lire l’illisible, autant que sur la représentation du langage oral dans un
texte  écrit.  Dans  cette  conversation monologique,  le  langage  est  mis  en  avant  comme
dépossession,  et  finit  par  ressembler  à  une  sorte  de  donjon  déserté  par  un  sujet  toujours
insaisissable. L’acquisition tardive du langage pour le narrateur, ainsi que son envie de retrouver
une existence pré-linguistique, son désir de « retourner dans la poussette », sont l’expression du
traumatisme qui consiste à se voir imposer une langue qui,  comme le suggère Derrida,  n’est
jamais la sienne : à voir sa langue, comme le remarque le narrateur, faire des choses par elle-
même, « as if it belonged to someone else ».
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